

Message Text

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ORIGIN ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 ARA-10 EUR-12 NEA-10 IO-13 ISO-00 PM-05
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DRAFTED BY ACDA/MA/IR:NWALDROP
APPROVED BY EUR/RPM:SLEDOGAR
NSC:RPUTNAM
ACDA/MA:CCFLOWERREE (SUBS)
ACDA/MA:RSTRAND
EUR/RPM:LBRECKON
NEA/RA:JMONTVILLE (SUBS)
IO/UNP:RBARRY
PM/DCA:MARIETTI
PM/SSP:PPERENYI
S/MS:MJOYCE
EUR/SOV:ABOHLEN
L/PM:MMATHESON
ACDA/GC:MMAZEAU
ACDA/WEC:EFINGEGOLD
DOD:EMELANSON

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 111026

USNATO FOR FLOWERREE AT OPENING OF BUSINESS, GENEVA FOR CCD

E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS:PARM, UN

SUBJECT:INFORMAL TALKING POINTS FOR NATO DISARMAMENT
EXPERTS MEETING, MAY 2-3, 1978

REF: A. USUN I624 (NOTAL), B. STATE II0723

SUMMARY: THIS CABLE PROVIDES BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND
INFORMAL TALKING POINTS FOR USDEL TO MAY 2-3 MEETING
OF NATO DISARMAMENT EXPERTS. ORGANIZATION OF CABLE
FOLLOWS OUTLINE OF TOPICS TO BE DISCUSSED. END SUM-
MARY

I. UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT

(A) SITUATION RESULTING FROM THE FIFTH PREPCOM

- (I) DECLARATION ON DISARMAMENT

-- FROM THE US POINT OF VIEW THE REMAINING SUBSTANTIVE
PROBLEMS WITH THE DECLARATION ON DISARMAMENT ARE AS
FOLLOWS:

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- - THE RELATIVE PRIORITIES OF CERTAIN CATEGORIES
- OF NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL MEASURES OF DIS-
- ARMAMENT.
- - THE TREATMENT OF NON-USE AND NON-THREAT OF USE
- OF FORCE, PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO NUCLEAR
- SECURITY ASSURANCES.
- - OBLIGATIONS WITH RESPECT TO NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE
- ZONES AND ZONES OF PEACE.
- - NON-PROLIFERATION AND ACCESS TO NUCLEAR MA-
- TERIALS FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES.
- - COMPLIANCE WITH AND WIDER ACCESSION TO EXIST-
- ING AGREEMENTS.
- - THE QUESTION OF MILITARY ALLIANCES AND THE
- PRESENCE OF FOREIGN MILITARY FORCES ON THE
- TERRITORY OF STATES.
- THE USG BELIEVES THAT DIFFERENCES IN THIS DOCUMENT
CAN POSSIBLY BE RESOLVED BY MEANS OF CONSULTATIONS AMONG
STATES, WITHOUT FURTHER RECOURSE TO CONSIDERATION BY A
DRAFTING GROUP.
- (2) PROGRAM OF ACTION

-- WORK ON THIS SECTION OF THE FINAL DOCUMENT PRODUCED THE SHARPEST DISAGREEMENTS, AND NEGOTIATIONS TO BRIDGE OR RECONCILE DIFFERING POSITIONS WERE EITHER UNSUCCESSFUL OR IMPOSSIBLE. AT THE ELEVENTH HOUR US-SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO PRESENT AGREED TEXTS ON SALT AND ON NUCLEAR ISSUES FELL APART BECAUSE THE USSR DELEGATION RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS REVERSING THEIR EARLIER TENTATIVE AGREEMENT TO DEVELOP A COMMON TEXT.

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-- THE SPECIFIC POINTS OF ISSUE IN THE PROGRAM OF ACTION ARE WELL KNOWN, AND WE DO NOT BELIEVE IT NECESSARY TO HAVE A DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THEM HERE. (FYI. PARAS 5 THROUGH 8 OF REFTEL A REFER. DEL MAY DRAW ON THIS MATERIAL AS DESIRED. END FYI.)

-- THE USG BELIEVES THAT THE WAY THE SSOD TREATS THE PROGRAM OF ACTION WILL BE CRUCIAL TO THE SUCCESS OF THE SSOD. A NUMBER OF DELEGATIONS HAVE EXPRESSED PUBLIC AND PRIVATE CONCERNS ABOUT THE PROSPECTS OF BRIDGING THE DIFFERENCES WHICH REMAIN IN THIS AND OTHER SECTIONS OF THE FINAL DOCUMENT THROUGH BARGAINING ON THE BASIS OF CONSENSUS. GIVEN THE LACK OF PROGRESS, THE QUESTION OF "RECOURSE TO VOTING" SEEMS A PREOCCUPATION -- PARTICULARLY AMONG THE NON-ALIGNED.

-- THE USG BELIEVES THESE CONCERNS ARE REAL AND FURTHER BELIEVES THAT VOTING ON ANY PART OF THE FINAL DOCUMENT WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY ALTER ITS CHARACTER. ALL DISCUSSIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS TO DATE HAVE BEEN ON THE BASIS OF CONSENSUS, ALTHOUGH THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE EFFORT TO ACHIEVE CONSENSUS ON THE CONTENTIOUS PORTIONS OF THE TEXT. SHOULD THIS PROCESS BREAK DOWN AT ANY POINT, WE BELIEVE THAT ALL STATES WOULD HAVE TO RECONSIDER THEIR POSITIONS ON SPECIFIC SECTIONS. THIS WOULD NO DOUBT LEAD TO A SERIOUS WORSENING OF THE ATMOSPHERE AT THE SSOD AND WOULD RESULT IN RANCOROUS DEBATE, WHICH SHOULD BE AVOIDED.

- (3) MACHINERY FOR DISARMAMENT

-- THE MACHINERY WORKING GROUP DID NOT ACCOMPLISH MUCH
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DURING PREPCOM V, LARGELY BECAUSE SEVERAL STATES HAVE NOT YET TAKEN DECISIONS ON DIFFICULT ISSUES INVOLVED IN RESTRUCTURING DISARMAMENT MECHANISMS. THE PRINCIPAL NEW ELEMENT IS THE NON-ALIGNED PROPOSAL FOR THE RECONVENING OF THE UN DISARMAMENT COMMISSION, WITH TERMS OF REFERENCE THAT INCLUDE FOLLOWING UP ON THE SSOD AND ELABORATING A

COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM ON DISARMAMENT. SOME REPS AT THE PREPCOM HAVE ADVANCED THE VIEW THAT THIS MAY BE AN ACCEPTABLE WAY TO MEET NON-ALIGNED PRESSURE FOR CHANGES IN DISARMAMENT INSTITUTIONS, ALTHOUGH THERE ARE ALSO CONCERNS THAT A REVIVED DISARMAMENT COMMISSION WOULD DUPLICATE EFFORTS IN THE FIRST COMMITTEE AND IN CCD. WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN HEARING THE VIEWS OF OUR ALLIES ON THIS.

-- ON RESTRUCTURING THE CCD THE NON-ALIGNED HAVE STRESSED THE NEED TO CREATE CONDITIONS WHICH WILL MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR ONE OR MORE ADDITIONAL MEMBERS OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL TO PARTICIPATE. TO THIS END THEY HAVE CALLED FOR THE ABOLITION OF THE CO-CHAIRMANSHIP AND HAVE PROPOSED A CLOSER LINK WITH THE UN. IT WOULD APPEAR, HOWEVER, THAT THEY DO NOT SEEK TO TRANSFORM THE CCD IN A WAY WHICH WOULD UNDERMINE ITS FUNCTIONAL AUTONOMY OR ITS CONSENSUS METHOD OF OPERATION. THE SOVIETS HAVE THUS FAR PUBLICLY RESISTED ANY CHANGES IN THE CCD LINK TO THE UN, IN CCD ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURES, OR IN THE CO-CHAIRMANSHIP. WE BELIEVE THE SOVIETS WILL WANT TO CONSIDER ALL MACHINERY QUESTIONS TOGETHER, INCLUDING THE CO-CHAIRMANSHIP.

-- THE USG IS PREPARED TO BE FLEXIBLE ON THE QUESTION OF THE CO-CHAIRMANSHIP, PROVIDED THAT A WORKABLE ALTERNATIVE CAN BE DEvised, POSSIBLY A ROTATING CHAIRMANSHIP OR A SINGLE NEUTRAL CHAIRMAN. WE BELIEVE THAT THE CCD SHOULD DETERMINE ITS PROGRAM OF WORK; THAT MEMBERSHIP MUST BE KEPT RELATIVELY SMALL (NO MORE THAN 40); AND THAT CONSENSUS MUST REMAIN CCD'S METHOD OF TAKING DECISIONS.

(B) NEW INITIATIVES

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-- BASED ON BREZHNEV'S SPEECH OF APRIL 25, IT IS QUITE EVIDENT THAT THE SOVIETS ARE CONSIDERING PUTTING FORWARD NEW INITIATIVES AT THE SSOD. (FYI. BREZHNEV'S SPEECH MENTIONED A HALT TO THE PRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN ALL THEIR FORMS; A HALT TO THE PRODUCTION AND BAN ON ALL OTHER TYPES OF MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS; A HALT TO THE CREATION OF NEW FORMS OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS WITH LARGE DESTRUCTIVE POWER; A RENUNCIATION OF EXPANDING ARMIES AND INCREASING CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS BY THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND BY COUNTRIES CONNECTED WITH THEM THROUGH MILITARY AGREEMENTS. BREZHNEV'S SPEECH ALSO CONTAINED A PARAGRAPH ON THE STANDING SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR A US-SOVIET RENUNCIATION OF ENHANCED RADIATION WEAPONS. REF B PROVIDES GUIDANCE TO POSTS ON THE QUESTION OF ER WEAPONS AT THE SSOD AND MAY BE DRAWN UPON. ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE FOR USDEL ON ER WEAPONS IS PROVIDED IN SEPTEL. WITH RESPECT TO SECURITY ASSURANCES, BREZHNEV'S SPEECH CONTAINS FOLLOWING SENTENCES: QUOTE. THE SOVIET UNION STATES WITH ALL CERTAINTY: WE ARE AGAINST THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. ONLY EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES -- AN

AGRESSION AGAINST OUR COUNTRY OR ITS ALLIES ON THE PART OF ANOTHER NUCLEAR POWER -- CAN COMPEL US TO RESORT TO THIS EXTREME MEANS OF SELF-DEFENSE. END QUOTE. END FYI.)

-- FOR OUR OWN PART, WE ARE CONSIDERING A RANGE OF POSSIBLE PROPOSALS DESIGNED TO IMPROVE STABILITY IN VARIOUS REGIONS AND TO ENHANCE PEACEFUL NUCLEAR COOPERATION (INCLUDING THE PROVISION OF INCENTIVES FOR STATES TO ADHERE TO THE NPT). THE FOLLOWING FOUR AREAS ARE OF SPECIFIC INTEREST TO OUR NATO ALLIES.

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-- AS HAS BEEN PUBLICLY ACKNOWLEDGED, THE US IS STUDYING THE IMPLICATIONS OF A PROPOSAL TO CUT OFF PRODUCTION OF FISSIONABLE MATERIALS FOR WEAPONS PURPOSES. HOWEVER, THERE HAS BEEN NO DECISION ON THIS QUESTION AS YET.

NUCLEAR SECURITY ASSURANCES

-- THE USG IS REVIEWING PROPOSALS FOR GIVING ASSURANCES, UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS, TO NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS WILL NOT BE USED AGAINST THEM. AS YET THERE ALSO HAS BEEN NO DECISION ON THIS SUBJECT.

-- WE WILL OBVIOUSLY KEEP ALLIANCE SECURITY AT THE FOREFRONT OF OUR CONSIDERATIONS DURING THIS REVIEW, AND WE WILL CONSULT CLOSELY WITH OUR ALLIES AS OUR POSITION ON THIS QUESTION IS CLARIFIED.

-- (IF THE UK CIRCULATES ITS DRAFT ON SECURITY ASSURANCES) THE US WOULD BE INTERESTED IN THE REACTIONS OF OTHERS, WHICH WILL BE FACTORED INTO THE US REVIEW.

DISARMAMENT-DEVELOPMENT LINK

-- THE USG IS AWARE OF THE CONCERN OF THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES THAT A PORTION OF THE SAVINGS RESULTING FROM DISARMAMENT BE CHanneled INTO DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE.

-- FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AND FOR POLICY REASONS, WE CANNOT ACCEPT AN AUTOMATIC LINKAGE. WITHIN THIS GENERAL SUBJECT AREA WE ARE EXPLORING ALTERNATIVES WHICH COULD ALSO ADVANCE OUR OTHER ARMS CONTROL INTERESTS.

REGIONAL ARMS CONTROL

-- WE ARE LOOKING AT POSSIBLE WAYS OF STRENGTHENING
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AND IMPROVING STABILITY IN VARIOUS REGIONS OF THE WORLD. THESE POSSIBILITIES INCLUDE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES AND REGIONAL LIMITATIONS ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS.

(C) PROSPECTS FOR THE SPECIAL SESSION

-- OUR BEST ASSESSMENT IS THAT THE SUCCESS OF THE SSOD WILL DEPEND ON TWO FACTORS:

- - OUR ABILITY TO HOLD THE LINE ON DECISION-MAKING BY CONSENSUS.
- - SUFFICIENT FLEXIBILITY IN THE NEGOTIATING POSITIONS OF THE NON-ALIGNED, SO THAT, IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE A CONSENSUS DOCUMENT WHICH WOULD COMMIT ALL UN MEMBERS TO A REALISTIC PROGRAM OF ACTION, THE MAJORITY OF UN MEMBERS WILL SOFTEN THEIR MORE EXTREME DEMANDS FOR SPECIFIC ACTIONS BY THE MAJOR MILITARY POWERS.

-- AT THE PRESENT TIME, HOWEVER, THE MOOD IS NOT GOOD. WE BELIEVE IT COULD POSSIBLY BE IMPROVED THROUGH CAREFUL CONSULTATIONS NOT ONLY WITH OUR ALLIES, BUT ALSO WITH LEADING MEMBERS OF THE NON-ALIGNED GROUP.

II. COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN, INCLUDING IN PARTICULAR THE SWEDISH EFFORTS FOR AN EARLY TEST RUN OF THE SEISMIC NETWORK DESIGNED BY THE CCD AD HOC EXPERTS GROUP

TRILATERAL CTB TALKS

-- THE US, UK, AND USSR WILL RESUME THEIR TRILATERAL CTB TALKS IN GENEVA ON MAY 4. WE EXPECT THESE TALKS TO RE-CONFIDENTIAL

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MAIN IN SESSION THROUGHOUT THE SSOD. THE CHANCES OF A TRILATERAL INITIATIVE BY THE TIME OF THE SSOD ARE SO SMALL AS TO BE NEGLIGIBLE.

-- AS IN THE PAST, THE ALLIES WILL BE KEPT INFORMED OF SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS.

SEISMIC NETWORK

BACKGROUND. THE REPORT OF CCD'S AD HOC GROUP OF SEISMIC EXPERTS (ADOPTED BY CONSENSUS, INCLUDING THE SOVIET AND EASTERN EXPERTS) CONTAINS SEVERAL REMARKS SUGGESTING THE NEED FOR AN EXPERIMENTAL EXERCISE, FOR TECHNICAL REASONS. THE PROBLEM LIES IN TIMING: THE SOVIETS DO NOT WANT A FORMAL EXPERIMENTAL EXERCISE TO OCCUR BEFORE A CTB ENTERS

INTO FORCE. OUR POSITION HAS BEEN TO LEND VOCAL SUPPORT FOR APPROPRIATE INITIATIVES RAISED BY OTHERS, BUT NOT TO PUT FORWARD PROPOSALS OURSELVES.

IN EARLY APRIL THE SWEDES FLOATED DRAFT TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR CONTINUING THE WORK OF THE AD HOC GROUP, AND THE SOVIETS RESPONDED WITH A COUNTER-DRAFT WHICH EXCLUDED THE POSSIBILITY OF AN EXPERIMENTAL EXERCISE. SWEDEN HAS NOW PRESENTED A THIRD VERSION TO THE USSR, WITH THE FOLLOWING SALIENT FEATURES:

- - EXTENSION OF THE MANDATE OF THE GROUP ON THE BASIS OF ITS PRESENT OPERATING PROCEDURES (E.G., MEETINGS IN GENEVA ONLY), SOLELY IN ORDER TO FORMULATE A DETAILED PLAN FOR AN EXPERIMENTAL EXERCISE.
- - AFTER RECEIPT OF THE GROUP'S FINAL REPORT, A DECISION BY CCD ON THE FEASIBILITY AND TIMING OF AN EXPERIMENTAL EXERCISE.

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FURTHER REPORTING FROM GENEVA MAY PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.

TALKING POINTS.

-- WE HAVE NO PROBLEMS WITH THE PRESENT SWEDISH PROPOSAL TO EXTEND THE EXPERTS GROUP IN ORDER TO PREPARE THE DETAILED PLAN OF AN EXPERIMENTAL EXERCISE.

-- HOWEVER, WE DO NOT KNOW WHAT STANCE THE SOVIETS WILL TAKE, AND WE WOULD WELCOME ANY INFORMATION THAT OTHERS MAY HAVE.

III. CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

THE CW DELEGATION IN GENEVA WILL CABLE A SUMMARY OF THE CURRENT SITUATION IN THE US-SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS. USDEL SHOULD DRAW ON THAT SUMMARY.

IV. REGIONAL ASPECTS OF DISARMAMENT, CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS

REGIONAL ASPECTS OF DISARMAMENT

-- WE CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE IDEA OF A UN STUDY ON REGIONAL ASPECTS OF DISARMAMENT, AS CALLED FOR IN UNGA RESOLUTION 32/87-D WHICH WAS SPONSORED BY BELGIUM.

-- WE ARE ENCOURAGED BY THE FORWARD MOTION WITH REGARD TO

THE TREATY OF TLATELOLCO, AND WE INTEND TO SUBMIT PROTOCOL I TO THE SENATE IN THE NEAR FUTURE. (FYI. THE EXACT DATE OF SUBMISSION HAS NOT YET BEEN DETERMINED. END FYI.) ARGENTINA HAS STATED ITS INTENTION TO RATIFY THE CONFIDENTIAL

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BASIC TREATY, BUT WITHOUT WAIVING THE CONDITIONS FOR ITS ENTRY INTO FORCE.

-- IN BREZHNEV'S SPEECH OF APRIL 25, THE USSR ANNOUNCED ITS INTENTION TO ADHERE TO PROTOCOL II. THIS REPRESENTS A HIGHLY CONSTRUCTIVE STEP, AND WE WELCOME IT.

-- WITH REGARD TO POSSIBLE NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONES (NWFZ'S) IN OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD, WE SEE NO PROSPECT OF SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS IN THE NEAR TERM.

-- REGIONAL NEGOTIATIONS COULD LEAD TO MILITARY STABILIZATION MEASURES AND ARMS LIMITATIONS WHICH WOULD BE PART OF AN OVERALL PEACE SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST. WE WOULD WANT TO ENCOURAGE THIS POSSIBILITY.

-- ALTHOUGH THE AYACUCHO DECLARATION HAS NOT YET LED TO CONCRETE RESULTS, ARMS LIMITATION ARRANGEMENTS COULD IN THE LONG RUN BE REACHED IN LATIN AMERICA.

-- AS A POSSIBLE OUTCOME OF THE INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE EVALUATION (INFCE), REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS WITH RESPECT TO THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE MAY PROVE DESIRABLE.

-- ANOTHER LONG-TERM POSSIBILITY WOULD BE FOR REGIONAL GROUPS OF STATES TO CONCLUDE AGREEMENTS LIMITING MILITARY EXPENDITURES. THE MODEL FORMAT FOR REPORTING MILITARY EXPENDITURES BEING DEVELOPED AS A RESULT OF SEVERAL UNSYG EXPERT GROUPS COULD SERVE A USEFUL PURPOSE IN REACHING SUCH REGIONAL AGREEMENTS. LIBERIA HAS INFORMED US THAT IT WILL PARTICIPATE IN THE PROPOSED PILOT TEST OF THE REPORTING MECHANISM, AND WE ARE CONTINUING TO ENCOURAGE OTHER LDC'S TO DO SO.

CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS (CAT)

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-- OUR CONSULTATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS ON THIS SUBJECT REMAIN AT A VERY PRELIMINARY STAGE. WE WILL BE MEETING WITH THEM IN HELSINKI ON MAY 4. IF THERE ARE ANY SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS WE WILL PROVIDE BRIEFINGS AS APPROPRIATE.

-- IN THE BROADER INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT, THE USG WOULD BE RECEPTIVE TO THE CREATION OF REGIONAL ASSOCIATIONS OF ARMS PURCHASER NATIONS, WHICH WOULD OPERATE IN COOPERATION WITH SUPPLIER NATIONS AND WHICH WOULD SEEK TO REDUCE THE RESOURCES DEVOTED TO UNNECESSARY COMPETITION IN PURCHASING ARMS.

-- AS A PRACTICAL MATTER THE INITIATIVE FOR CREATING REGIONAL ASSOCIATIONS OF ARMS PURCHASERS WILL HAVE TO COME FROM THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED. OTHERWISE THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WOULD TEND TO VIEW SUCH EFFORTS AS A PLOT CONCOCTED BY ARMS PRODUCERS TO KEEP THEM IN A POLITICALLY DISADVANTAGEOUS POSITION. NEVERTHELESS, ARMS SUPPLIERS CAN PLAY AN IMPORTANT PART IN ENCOURAGING AND SUPPORTING REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS.

-- THERE IS LITTLE ENTHUSIASM AMONG DEVELOPING COUNTRIES FOR THE CREATION OF REGIONAL ASSOCIATIONS OF ARMS PURCHASERS. AREAS OF RELATIVELY LOW TENSION, SUCH AS LATIN AMERICA, MAY BE THE MOST PROMISING. WE WOULD WELCOME ANY SUGGESTIONS ON HOW TO STIMULATE SUCH INTEREST.

-- WE DOUBT THE WISDOM OF ATTEMPTING TO LINK REGIONAL ASSOCIATIONS OF ARMS PURCHASERS TO THE UN. EACH GROUP OF COUNTRIES WILL WANT TO REACH ITS OWN DECISIONS, WITHOUT NECESSARILY HAVING TO BE RESPONSIVE TO THE WISHES OF OTHERS. A LINK TO THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD BE UNCONFIDENTIAL

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WISE, BECAUSE THE VETO POWER OF PERMANENT MEMBERS WOULD MAKE THE IDEA A COMPLETE NON-STARTER IN THE EYES OF THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. IN ADDITION, LINKAGE TO A BODY RESPONSIVE TO THE UNGA COULD LEAD TO TROUBLESOME UN INTERFERENCE IN EUROPEAN ARMS CONTROL MEASURES.

-- FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE SSOD AND THE 33RD UNGA, THE US DOES SUPPORT THE JAPANESE IDEA FOR A UN STUDY ON CAT, AS IT APPEARS IN THE WESTERN SUBMISSION FOR THE PROGRAM OF ACTION. HOWEVER, WE ARE HIGHLY UNCERTAIN THAT GIVEN THE VIEWS OF THE NON-ALIGNED IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO DEVELOP TERMS OF REFERENCE WHICH ATTRACT BROAD-BASED SUPPORT.

-- AN IMPORTANT OBJECTIVE FOR THE SSOD IS TO OBTAIN ENDORSEMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF ARMS TRANSFER RESTRAINT, BOTH IN THE DECLARATION ON DISARMAMENT AND IN THE PROGRAM OF ACTION. WE WOULD HOPE IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO OBTAIN SUCH ENDORSEMENT WITHOUT INCLUDING MENTION OF RESTRAINTS ON PRODUCTION, WHICH COULD RAISE PROBLEMS FOR US.

-- NON-ALIGNED SUSPICIONS IN REGARD TO STUDIES OF CAT LEAD TO CALLS FOR INCLUDING ARMS PRODUCTION AND CO-PRO-

DUCTION IN SUCH STUDIES. BECAUSE WESTERN COUNTRIES ARE OPEN SOCIETIES AND BECAUSE EASTERN COUNTRIES ARE NOT, WE HAVE BELIEVED THAT THIS WOULD WORK TO THE DISADVANTAGE TO THE WEST. MORE IMPORTANTLY, IT COULD BUILD PRESSURES FOR CONTROLS ON PRODUCTION, AN IDEA WHICH COULD PRODUCE PROBLEMS FOR NATO. IF CONTROVERSY OVER THE CONTENT OF THE UN STUDY BEGINS TO JEOPARDIZE ENDORSEMENT OF CAT RESTRAINT, WE WOULD WANT TO REEVALUATE WHETHER TO PRESS FOR STUDY OF TRANSFERS.

-- IN THE FIELD OF CAT THE US BELIEVES THAT ORGANIZED CONSULTATIONS WOULD BE USEFUL. THE US WOULD BE INTERESTED IN PARTICIPATING IN SUCH CONSULTATIONS.
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V. HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS: THE 1979 UN CONFERENCE ON SPECIFIC CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

BACKGROUND. DURING THE FOUR SESSIONS (1974-1977) OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON HUMANITARIAN LAW, THE SWEDES AND OTHERS ADVOCATED RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS ALLEGED TO BE INDISCRIMINATE OR INHUMAN. THE AD HOC COMMITTEE OF THE CONFERENCE DISCUSSED THE QUESTION OF THE PROHIBITION OF OR RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF NAPALM AND OTHER INCENDIARY MUNITIONS, MINES AND BOOBY-TRAPS, FUEL-AIR EXPLOSIVES, HIGH-VELOCITY SMALL CALIBER PROJECTILES, CERTAIN TYPES OF IMPROVED FRAGMENTATION WEAPONS, AND FUTURE WEAPONS (E.G., LASERS). THE ONLY CATEGORIES OF WEAPONS FOR WHICH AGREEMENT APPEARS POSSIBLE WITHIN THE NOT TOO DISTANT FUTURE ARE NON-X-RAY DETECTABLE FRAGMENTS, LAND MINES AND BOOBY-TRAPS, AND THE USE OF INCENDIARIES IN POPULATED AREAS.

LAST SUMMER THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ADOPTED A CONSENSUS RESOLUTION WHICH CALLED FOR A CONFERENCE OF GOVERNMENTS NO LATER THAN 1979 TO COMPLETE THIS WORK, AND WHICH ALSO ASKED THE UNGA TO TAKE FURTHER ACTIONS NECESSARY FOR THE HOLDING OF SUCH A CONFERENCE. BY RESOLUTION 32/152 OF LAST DECEMBER THE UNGA APPROVED THE IDEA OF A 1979 CONFERENCE AND CALLED FOR A SERIES OF PREPARATORY MEETINGS, THE FIRST OF WHICH IS TO BE HELD IN GENEVA DURING AUGUST-SEPTEMBER 1978. BECAUSE THE SPONSORS OF THE UNGA RESOLUTION DECLINED TO GIVE ANY REASONABLE ASSURANCES THAT DECISIONS WOULD BE TAKEN ONLY BY CONSENSUS, THE US, THE MAJOR WESTERN EUROPEAN MILITARY POWERS, AND THE USSR ABSTAINED.

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TALKING POINTS.

-- THE USG SUPPORTS THE 1979 CONFERENCE OF GOVERNMENTS CONCERNING POSSIBLE RESTRICTIONS ON CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THAT THE WORK OF THE PREPARATORY CONFERENCE CAN BE CONCLUDED SUCCESSFULLY ONLY IF DECISIONS ARE TAKEN ON THE BASIS OF CONSENSUS, SO AS TO ENSURE BROAD SUPPORT OF IMPORTANT MILITARY POWERS. WE WILL STRONGLY OPPOSE ANY ATTEMPT IN THE 1978 PREPARATORY CONFERENCE TO TAKE DECISIONS BY VOTE.

-- THE USG BELIEVES THAT THE FIRST PREPARATORY CONFERENCE SHOULD FOCUS ON SUBSTANTIVE RATHER THAN ON PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS, SO AS TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE IS REASONABLE PROSPECT FOR AGREEMENT AND TO MOVE FORWARD ON THE REAL WORK OF THE CONFERENCE OF GOVERNMENTS.

-- WE BELIEVE THAT THE SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS SHOULD FOCUS ON AREAS WHERE THERE APPEARS TO BE THE BEST CHANCE OF AGREEMENT (MINES AND BOOBY-TRAPS, USE OF INCENDIARIES IN POPULATED AREAS, AND WEAPONS RELYING ON NON-DETECTABLE FRAGMENTS).

-- (IF ASKED) WE CONSIDER IT IMPORTANT THAT ANY FORMAL ALLIANCE CONSULTATIONS ON THE PREPARATORY CONFERENCE BE DEFERRED UNTIL LATE JUNE, PREFERABLY IN THE SAME WEEK AS THE DISCUSSIONS NOW SCHEDULED FOR JUNE 28 ON THE PROTOCOLS TO THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS. THIS WILL ALLOW POLICY AND LEGAL EXPERTS FAMILIAR WITH THESE SUBJECTS TO TAKE PART.

NATO MEETING OF LEGAL AND POLITICAL EXPERTS ON PROTOCOLS TO THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS

BACKGROUND. SEVERAL NATO COUNTRIES (PARTICULARLY THE FRG AND THE UK) HAVE CALLED FOR EXPERTS MEETINGS TO COORDI-
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NATE THE ACTIONS OF NATO MEMBERS IN RATIFYING AND INTERPRETING THE TWO PROTOCOLS (PRIMARILY, THOSE ASPECTS WHICH DEAL WITH THE RULES OF WARFARE) TO THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS WHICH WERE ADOPTED LAST YEAR BY THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE. (THE US AND MOST OTHER NATO COUNTRIES HAVE SIGNED BUT NOT YET RATIFIED THE PROTOCOLS.) ALTHOUGH WE BELIEVE THAT THE FRG AND OTHERS ARE EXAGGERATING THE POSSIBLE PROBLEMS FOR NATO MILITARY OPERATIONS POSED BY THE PROTOCOLS, WE HAVE AGREED TO A MEETING OF LEGAL AND POLITICAL EXPERTS. THE POLADS HAVE NOW SET JUNE 28 AS THE OPENING DATE FOR A TWO- TO THREE-DAY MEETING OF EXPERTS. IN ADDITION, THE FRG HAS CALLED FOR A PARALLEL MILITARY STUDY BY THE NATO STAFF; PENDING THE RECEIPT OF A MORE SPECIFIC PROPOSAL, WE AND OTHERS HAVE WITHHELD COMMENT.

TALKING POINT.

-- (IF ASKED) BEFORE COMMENTING ON THE IDEA OF A MILITARY STUDY OF THE PROTOCOLS BY THE INTERNATIONAL STAFF, WE WOULD WISH TO CONSIDER THE SPECIFIC TERMS OF REFERENCE UNDER WHICH SUCH A STUDY WOULD BE CONDUCTED.

VI. NEW MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS (NEW MDW), RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

NEW MDW

-- THE USSR HAS REITERATED ITS INSISTENCE, REFLECTED IN ITS SUBMISSION FOR THE PROGRAM OF ACTION, THAT THE SSOD ENDORSE THE NEGOTIATION OF A GENERAL TREATY BANNING ANY NEW TYPES OF MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS.

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-- WE ANTICIPATE THAT THE SSOD WILL TREAT THE QUESTION OF NEW MDW MUCH AS THE 32ND UNGA DID, AND THAT THE RESULT WILL BE TO ENDORSE BOTH EASTERN AND WESTERN APPROACHES.

-- NEVERTHELESS, THE WESTERN COUNTRIES SHOULD AS FAR AS POSSIBLE ATTEMPT TO DISSIPATE WIDESPREAD CONFUSION ON WHAT DOES AND WHAT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A NEW TYPE OF MDW. THESE EFFORTS SHOULD OF COURSE BE BASED ON THE 1948 DEFINITION OF MDW REACHED BY THE UN COMMISSION FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS. (FYI. THE OPERATIVE PORTION OF THAT DEFINITION READS AS FOLLOWS: "ATOMIC EXPLOSIVE WEAPONS, RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL WEAPONS, LETHAL CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, AND ANY OTHER WEAPONS DEVELOPED IN THE FUTURE WHICH HAVE CHARACTERISTICS COMPARABLE IN DESTRUCTIVE EFFECT TO THOSE OF THE ATOMIC BOMB OR OTHER WEAPONS MENTIONED ABOVE." END FYI.)

-- IN PARTICULAR, WESTERN COUNTRIES SHOULD POINT OUT THAT DELIVERY VEHICLES (E.G., AIRCRAFT AND MISSILES) ARE NOT MDW AS SUCH. THUS DEVELOPMENT OF NEW AIRCRAFT OR MISSILES DOES NOT REPRESENT DEVELOPMENT OF NEW TYPES OF MDW.

RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS (RW)

THE RW DELEGATION IN GENEVA WILL CABLE A SUMMARY OF THE CURRENT SITUATION IN THE US-SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS. USDEL SHOULD DRAW ON THAT SUMMARY. VANCE

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<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 26 sep 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: DISARMAMENT, MEETINGS, CONSULTANTS, BRIEFING MATERIALS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 02 may 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
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Drafter: ACDA/MA/IR:NWALDROP
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Expiration:
Film Number: D780186-0246
Format: TEL
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
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Message ID: 8c763895-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ORIGIN ACDA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
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Subject: INFORMAL TALKING POINTS FOR NATO DISARMAMENT EXPERTS MEETING, MAY 2-3, 1978
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